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In the second book of the Physics, Aristotle distinguishes between 
natural objects and others. Speaking of natural things, he says: 
Each of them bas within itself a prinCiple of motion and of 
stationariness.... On the otherhand, abedand acoatand anything 
else ofthat sort, qua receiving these designations-i.e. insofar as 
they are products of art-have no innate impulse to change. 
(Phys. n.1.192b14-19) 
ThediscussiontakesquiteadifferenttuminBookEight.Speakingofanimal 
motion, Aristotle tells us: 
... they are unmoved at one time and then again they are in 
motion, as it seems. We must grasp the fact, therefore, that 
animals move themselves onlywith one kind ofmotion (locomo­
tion), and that this is notstncUy originated by them. The cause of 
it is not derivedfrom the animal itself .... (Phys. VITI.6.259b6-8; 
emphasis added) 
What are we to make of these accounts? In the first, Aristotle seems simply 
to equate nature with "self-change" and he explicitl y lists" animals, and their 
parts ... and plants and the simple bodies" (earth, fire, air, water) as examples 
(see Phys. II.1.192b8-1O). But the second passage apparently confuses the 
picture. In Charlton's words, "It is a central thesis ofPhys. VIII tllat nothing 
changes itself, that whatever is subject to change is changed by something 
else" (Charlton, p. 91). 
Does the apparent inconsistency of these two passages make a 
strong case for taking them to reveal two incommensurable hypotheses? Or 
can they, on the other hand, be read together as merely different (possibly 
progressive) accounts of motion that are fundamentally consistent? In this 
paper, I wish to suggest that Aristotle's different theories of natural motion 
are grounded in attempts to answer separate questions and that they can only 
be made fully inteUigible by reco gnizing their place in distinct developmen­
tal systems. 
The De Caelo, regarded by most scholars as one of Aristotle's 
earliest physical treatises, furtller draws out the definition ofnatural motion 
as "self-change" that we sawin Physics II. The second chapter of the De Caelo 
contains this discussion of the principle of movement of natural bodies: 
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Let us take this as our starting point. All natural bodies and 
magnitudes we hold to be, as such, capable of locomotion; for 
nature, we say, is their principle of movement.... Bodies are 
either simple or compounded of such; and by simple bodies I 
mean those which possess a principle of movement in their own 
nature. (De Caelo 1.2.268b15-28) 
Natural bodies, on this view, are those which are able to move themselves 
under their own power. Motion is not further analyzed down into more basic 
terms. Such a view squares nicely with much of the doctrine that character­
izes the Organon and (what are generally assumed to be) Aristotle's earlier 
works in general. Compare this account with the following discussion of 
substance in the Categories: "Substance, in the truest and most definite 
sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable ofa subject nor present 
in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse" (Cat. 5.2all-13). 1his 
view of substance as an "organic unity" (e.g. a particular manor horse) lends 
itselfnicely to such a straightforward account of motion. No reference to the 
exterior movers or the hylomorphism that characterize his more mature 
physical works is required. 
Further passages in the De Caelo bear out this view. Later in that 
same chapter, Aristotle shows that 
... there must naturally be some simple body which revolves 
naturally and in virtue of its own nature with a circular move­
ment. By constraint, of course, it may be brought to move with the 
motion of something else different from itself, but it cannot so 
move naturally, since there is one sort ofmovement natural to 
each of the simple bodies. (De Caelo 1.2.269a6-9; emphasis 
added) 
Although Aristotle is concerned with showing in the first book of the De 
Caelo that the "fifth element" has a principle ofmotion within itself, he also 
implicitly shows motion to be the natural power ofa thing to change itself. 
No hint of his form/matter distinction nor any sort of reference to any 
unmoved mover as he envisions it in Book Eight ofthe Physics is needed to 
round out his account. W.K.C. Guthrie sums up von Arnim's appraisal ofthe 
situation in this way: 
The idea is that, as described in De Caelo, the revolving sphere 
of aether has the principle of its motion entirely within itself, that 
it is impossible that A. could have described it as he docs there if 
be bad already worked out in his mind the doctrine of an unmoved 
mover as the ultimate source of motion. (Guthrie, p. 164) 
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Now, Guthrie disagrees with von Arnim about the commensurability of the 
unmoved mover hypothesis with a model of motion Uke the one Aristotle 
describes in the first book of the De Caelo. On Guthrie's view, Aristotle's 
accounts of motion can, in fact, be read on a developmental continuum and 
he denies that they are self-contradictory in any meaningful way. This is an 
important question but one which I shall have to return to. At any rate, it is 
importantto note that for both, theunmoved moverofBookEighthad no sort 
of essential role to play in the physics of motion of De Caelo. 
The De Caelo passages I have mentioned serve to illustrate apoint 
upon which there is widespread convergence among commentators. Harold 
Cherniss reports that Moreau and w.n. Ross (as well as Guthrie and von 
Arnim) fail to see the necessity of a transcendent mover in Aristotle's De 
Caelo account. 
W.D. Ross also holds that at the time of writing the De Caelo 
account Aristotle still believed in self-motion but a self-motion 
of immanent star-souls, not of the fIfth essence itself ... Moreau, 
who takes the De Caelo to be "animistic" in conception, asserts 
that the unmoved mover does not appear in this work and 
apparently ascribes self-motion to the principle which be says is 
here immanent in the universe (Cbemiss, p. 584). 
What is more, certain passages in the De Caelo seem to exclude the 
possibility of an unmoved mover altogether. The following discussion of 
"divinity," for example, depends upon the idea that natural motion is 
essentially simple and self-imposed: 
... whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is 
necessarily unchangeable .... For there is nothing stronger than it 
to move it-since that would mean more divine--and it has no 
defect and lacks none of the proper excellences. Its unceasing 
11Wvement. then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to 
11Wve when it comes to itsproperplace.... (De Caelo 1.9.279832­
b2; emphasis added) 
The following passage, from De Coolo III, seems to indicate that there was 
still something left of "natural motion" even after the introduction ofa prime 
mover: "For the prime mover must cause motion in virtue ofits own natural 
movement, and the other bodies, moving without constraint, as they came 
to rest in their proper places. would fall into the order in which they now 
stand" (De Caelo III.2.300b21-22). 
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Aristotle's developing theology in the. De Caelo seems to consis­
tently come back to the idea that motion is fundamentally self-determined. 
'This is not to say that there are not passages in the De Caelo that explicitly 
mention an unmoved mover of the same stock as the one developed in 
Physics VTII and Metaphysics XII. Fairly explicit references are made to 
such a mover at (for example) 288a27-b7; 311a9-12; and 277b9-1O. But 
such references seem to be anomalies when compared with the general 
direction that the arguments in the De Caelo are headed. Certainly they bear 
more of a resemblance to the more full y-developed views ofAristotle's later 
physical works. Cherniss points out that von Arnim. Ross, Moreau, and 
Guthrie an take these references to be later additions (Cherniss p. 584). At 
any rate, it cannot be denied that the systematic backdrop that these passages 
depend on is not fully present in De Caelo. That alone gives us a prima facie 
reason to regard the passages as suspiciously late. 
I have relied heavily upon De Caelo up to thispointto give a picture 
of Aristotle's earliest explanations of motion. The reason is simply that 
references in other early works to the problem are practically non-existent. 
There is, however, a brief passage in the Analytica Posteriora that is worth 
considering. In the context of showing that nature often acts for both 
material and final causes, Aristotle says: 
Necessity too is of two kinds. It may work in accordance with a 
thing's natural tendency, or by constrain l and in opposition to it; 
as, for instance, by necessity a slone is borne both upwards and 
downwards, but not by the same necessity. (AnPo. II.11.95al-3) 
What makes this passage particularly relevant is not the fact that Aristotle 
refers to the "natural tendency" of a thing without mentioning any sort of 
external source; we have already seen many such examples in De Caelo. 
What is striking is simply its occurrence in the Organon. The fact that he is 
not concerned with motion per se in the passage gives us a glimpse of the 
direction in which Aristotle's earlier thought was naturally inclined: such an 
intuitive view would surely have informed the more full-blooded theory he 
offers in De Caelo. 
Charlton notes that the Greek word Aristotle uses here, horme, 
means something like "active striving." After citing other passages in which 
the same word appears, Charlton observes: 
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In every case... the nature involved seems to be the material 
elementofa thing .... This strongly suggests that be thinks that the 
material of a thing can be a source of change because it has an 
active tendency to change independent of any external cause 
(Charlton, p. 92). 
The simplicity of the account given the De Caelo and the Analytica 
posteriora must have been appealing to Aristotle from a common-sense 
perspective. We do tend to contrast natural things with others by talking 
about their origins. It makes perfect sense to say that natural things are 
characterized by an innate capacity for change, whereas artificial products 
(qua artificial) are only changed by external forces (see Physics II.l.192b 12­
26). To paraphrase Aristotle's example, a tree is a natural object because it 
has the power of growth within itself whereas a bed or chair does not. 
But how does this explanation square with the development of 
Aristotle's later views in the Physics? Recall, for example, the analysis of 
animal motion that I quoted at the outset. In Book VIII, Aristotle claims that 
animal motion is not strictly self-motion and that "the cause of it is not 
derived from the animal itself' (Phys. VllI.4.256a2-3). Indeed, itis a general 
thesis of Physics VllI that "all things in motion must be moved by 
something" (Phys. VIIIA.256a2-3). Richard Sorabji sees that dilemma like 
this: 
In Physics 2.1, his task is to distinguish natural objects from 
artificial ones, and he does so by saying that natural objects have 
an internal source of change, their nature.... Aristotle concludes 
that nature is an internal (en) source and cause (arkhe and aitia) 
of motion (kineisthai) or rest (eremein) .... But in Physics 8.4, 
Aristotle is constrained by an opposite consideration. In order to 
make room for God as that by which the heavens are moved, he 
has to support Plato's principle that whatever is in motion is 
moved by something (Sorabji, p. 219). 
Sorabji points out (rightly, I think) that Aristotle seems to have different 
purposes in giving his distinct accounts. Sarah Waterlow expands on this 
idea: 
... the concept of living things as self-changers figures in Physics 
VIII not as an item of interest in itself. but purely as a step in an 
argument concerned with other issues. [The discussion of] 'self­
change' [in the Physics] tells us nothing about organic sub­
stance.... It is intended to uphold a certain conclusion concerning 
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the ultimate source of change in the universe as a whole, and 
Aristotle has accordingly invested 'self-change' with no more 
meaning than is necessary for the discharge of this ulterior 
function (Waterlow, p. 216). 
The point that Sorabji and Waterlow are making is Significant. Aristotle's 
discussion of self-change in the Physics is always informed by a greater 
enterprise: he wants to give an account of an eternal, unmoved source of 
motion. "It looks as if in the Physics he already knew the conclusion he 
thought right. that God, and not any celestial soul, is the prime mover, but 
that the tools for securing this conclusion were not available to him until he 
had written the de Anima and Metaphysics Book 12" (Sorabji p. 225). 
With this in mind, we can piece together Aristotle's strategy by 
looking at the interpretation that he tried to place on his own earlier works. 
In Physics VIII.4, Aristotle makes the claim that whatever is changed must 
be changed "by something"; he draws this point out by making a distinction 
between the agent and patient of motion: 
The fact that a thing that is in motion derives its motion from 
something is most evident in things that are in motion unnatu­
rally, because in such cases it is clear that the motion is derived 
from something other than the thing itself. Next to things that are 
in motion unnaturally those whose motion while natural is 
derived from themselves-e.g. animals-make this fact clear: 
for here the uncertainty is not as to whether the motion is derived 
from something hut as to how weought to distinguish in the thing 
between the movent and the thing moved. It would seem that in 
animals, just as in ships and things not naturally organize~ that 
which causes motion is separate from that which suffers motion, 
and that it is only in this sense that the animal as a whole causes 
its own motion. (Physics VIIIA.254b24-33) 
W.D. Ross claims that Aristotle's VIII.4 account of motion is simply a 
fiIling-outoftheearlier, De Cae10 view . On Ross's interpretation, Aristotle's 
initial, simple equation ofmotion with an inherent capacity to change is not 
sufficient to demonstrate how the capacity for motion becomes fully 
realized. He says, "The answer which Aristotle finally reached is that 
capacity is realized always by the action on the potential of that which is 
already actual. And this he came to see to be incompatibJe with self­
movement" (Ross, pp. 98-9). 
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Aristotle's strategy becomes more meaningful if we recall that he 
has by this time introduced his form/matter distinction. By replacing the 
simple unity of substance of the Organon with the complex version of his 
mature physical works, he has allowed himself to creatively redescribe 
motion and self-change on a new paradigm. Rather than interpret self­
change as a simple function of organic unities (e.g. "man," "horse," "tree") 
he Is able to further analyze the motion of even these unities into more 
fundamental parts. Thus, he is able to analyze the motion of. say, an animal, 
into a "movent" and a "thing moved." Clearly, he is playing on the ambiguity 
of the phrase "changed by something other" to try to find a "something 
other" within what he formerly took to be a simple substance. 'This is related 
to the point Waterlow makes when she says, "Aristotle's deliberately 
indiscriminate use of 'changed by something other' puts him at a strategic 
advantage vis-a-vis the question of what exactly we are to suppose should 
be meant by something's being changed 'by itself" (Waterlow, p. 207). 
What, then, are we to make of this ambiguity? Should we take 
Aristotle to be-as Waterlow puts it-at a "strategic advantage," one that 
allows himto further develop an old doctrine in response to new challenges? 
Or ought we to read him as making a radical break from his earlier views and 
attempting to combine elements of two incommensurable systems? 
Waterlow argues that Aristotle is successful in his attempt. But she 
recognizes that she faces an immediate difficulty in trying to bring the two 
views together into one coherent theory. She asks: 
... how can the self-change "whole" be itself a substance, if it 
consists in a substance plus something else? But perhaps this 
ought to be dismissed as a spurious paradox generated by 
gratuitously introducing terms like 'in addition to' and 'plus.' 
Aristotle does not state, nor does he necessarily imply, that the 
difference must be such that the two are addible. Presumably he 
means that in self-change the changer and changed are not 
numerically different individuals. Resorting to handy words, let 
us say that he has in mind different aspects of the same individual 
(Waterlow, p. 212). 
I think that Waterlow's reading of Aristotle is charitable-perhaps too much 
so. The very difficulty of reconciling the doctrines of the Organon and 
earlier physical works with the later physical works lies in Aristotle's 
waffling about what even the most basic terms (such as "substance") are to 
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mean. This indecision becomes particularly acute in the second book ofthe 
Physics where Aristotle tries to: on the one hand, (continue to) retain the 
common-sense idea that natural objects are those that move themselves; 
and, on the other hand, set up an argument designed to show (in the 
Metaphysics and in the Iaterbooks of the Physics) that there must be a source 
of eternal motion and change which is independent of particular natural 
things. 
Aristotle's reliance on his mature actuali ty/potentiality doctrine 
lllustrates this very discrepancy. As I have already indicated, Ross notes that 
the capacity for change "is realized always by the action of the potential of 
that which is already actual." And, in order to realize movement, "the mover 
must already be in the state which is the tenninus ofthe movement; in order 
to be moved, the moved must not yet be in that state" (Ross pp. 98-9; see 
Physics VIII.5.257a33-257b14). But, significantly, this view of actualityl 
potentiality differs markedly from earlier discussions in the Organon. 
Daniel Graham points out that energia (or "actuality") in the Organon is not 
explicitly connected with hylomorphism; in fact, Aristotle makes it a point 
to show that energia is an activity rather that a capacity (Graham, p. 99; see 
Top. IV.5.125b15-9). 
The "spurious paradox" Waterlow refcrs to runs more deeply than 
she realizes. Itgoes to the very heart of Aristotle's philosophy. The problem, 
as Graham has pointed out, is that Aristotle himself sometimes treats form 
and matter as separate entities; it is precisely his avowal ofhylomorphism 
in the later works that informs his conccption of energia as "capacity" and 
facilitates a complex account ofnatural motion in Book Eight ofthePhysics. 
This is the very point Graham takes up in the following discussion of 
Aristotle's mature philosophical system-what Graham refers to as 82: 
According to hylomorphism the concrete substance is divisible 
into form and matter. This is a fundamental fact of analysis of S 2: 
the sensible substance is a composite, not a simple individual. 
The analysis seems to invite a question about the composite itsclf: 
which componenlmakes the substantial compound substantial? 
It is form or matter? Since the sensible substance is analyzed into 
two components, one of them must be responsible for the sub­
stantiality of the whole .... Because Aristotle analyses the sen­
sible substance into form and matter, he assumes that it must be 
reduced to form and matter (Graham, p. 278), 
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Aristotle's argument for complex natural motion, hinging as it does on his 
latter conception of energia, or actuality, is thus bound up intimately with 
the logical status of form and matter in his ontology. In these terms, then, 
Graham goes on to recommend the same linethatWaterlow insists on: "How 
then should we view form and matter? It seems to me that we should take 
them not as components in the normal sense .... We should rather conceive 
of them as aspects of the sensible substance" (Graham, p. 279). However, 
Graham recognizes (as Waterlow does not) that such a recommendation can 
only stand as an after-the-fact suggestion to Aristotle. The fact remains that 
Aristotle does equivocate terms between the earlier works on the one hand 
and his more mature thought on the other. To deny this would be to affirm 
that the whole of the Aristotelian corpus is thoroughly consistent-surely an 
impossible hypothesis to defend. 
So where does that leave us with respect to our original question? 
I want to recommend that we go back to an observation that I made earlier. 
Both the earlier and later accounts of self-change that Aristotle offers are 
targeted at answering different questions (or at least questions that arise in 
distinct contexts). The De Caelo (and otller early works as well) tried to 
define natural moti0 n in relati vely simple terms; the paradigm that Aristotle 
worked from was the one exemplified in the Organon and referred to by 
Graham as S1-what Graham takes to be Aristotle's earlier philosophical 
system (see Graham 1987). The Physics account (after Book Two) tried to 
define motion against an entirely different backdrop and with an entirely 
different purpose in mind. Aristotle's discussions ofself-change and natural 
change were subsequently brought out to demonstrate the logical necessity 
of an unmoved mover and to "uphold a certain conclusion concerning the 
ultimate, eternal source of change in the universe as a whole" (Waterlow, 
p. 216). The Physics II account, then, appears to mark an awkward shift: 
between Aristotle's early conception of natural change and the adoption of 
hylomorphic principles (introduced in Phys. I) that would later provide the 
framework for his emerging complex agenda. 
It seems, then, that attempts to reconcile Aristotle's theories of 
motion (either in terms ofone coherent system or along loose developmental 
lines) are wrong-headed. We are better off sorting out his accounts ofmotion 
according to the paradigms he is working against and in terms ofthe specific 
questions he is trying to answer. 
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